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Determinants of the quality of external board evaluation in the UK 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study examines the influence of the following on the quality of externally 
facilitated board evaluation: timing of adoption of external board evaluation, type of evaluators, 
and the independence of external facilitators. 
  
Design/methodology/approach – The statements on board evaluation in annual reports of a 
sample of FTSE 350 companies were content analysed to measure the quality of externally 
facilitated board evaluation. We then used descriptive analysis and inferential statistics to 
demonstrate the possible association between the timing of adoption as well as the type and 
independence of external facilitators, and the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation. 
 
Findings – Results reveal some effects of the timing of adoption as well as the type and 
independence of external facilitators on the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation. 
 
Practical implications – Shareholders should be aware of the timing of adoption as well as 
consider the types and independence of external facilitators, given their influence on the quality 
of externally facilitated board evaluation. Regulatory authorities should provide more specific 
guidance on what types of professional organisations can be engaged as external facilitators 
and on the implementation of externally facilitated board evaluation, in order to promote its 
quality. 
 
Originality/value – Several studies have provided theoretical accounts on how board 
evaluation should be conducted to ensure its effectiveness. However, there is a dearth of 
empirical literature, which examines the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation. This 
study develops a quality measure for externally facilitated board evaluation and shows the 
effect of the timing of adoption, types and independence of external facilitators on its quality. 
Our study forges ahead an institutional theorising of external board evaluation. 
 
Keywords Board evaluation, institutional theory, external facilitators, content analysis, United 
Kingdom 
 





External board evaluation in the UK 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Board evaluation in the UK has received heightened attention in recent years after the 
legitimacy, integrity and accountability of the board directors were seriously questioned, 
following the financial malfeasances by many large companies (UK House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, 2009). While self-evaluation of the effectiveness of the board of directors 
and its committees has long been seen to enhance the accountability of the board of directors 
(NYSE, 2009), scholars continue to highlight the risks of self-evaluation being used as a self-
serving exercise (Conger & Lawler, 2003), given its minimalist approach (Long, 2006). To 
overcome these limitations, an externally facilitated evaluation of the board of directors has 
been recommended (Nordberg and Booth, 2019; Walker, 2009; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). For 
example, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) incorporated the provision of externally 
facilitated board evaluation into the UK corporate governance (CG) Code - 2010 based on the 
recommendation of Walker Review (FRC, 2010). The FRC has kept this provision unchanged 
in subsequent revisions of the codes (e.g., FRC, 2018)1 and many countries promptly embraced 
externally facilitated board evaluation into their new CG codes (Nordberg and Booth, 2019).  
 
However, prior studies on external board evaluation have only developed frameworks 
(Nordberg and Booth, 2019; Minichilli et al., 2007; Kiel & Nicholson, 2005) or recommended 
using the balanced scorecard (Epstein and Roy, 2004a; Epstein and Roy, 2004b) to evaluate 
the performance of the board of directors. Few other studies have examined the usefulness of 
the balanced scorecard in evaluating board performance and offered mixed evidence (Aly and 
Mansour, 2017; Northcott and Smith, 2011; Ling et al., 2009). In addition, a very scant 
empirical studies in this space have used a limited number of survey or interview responses to 
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understand the types of board evaluation conducted by companies and their possible 
consequences (Booth and Nordberg, 2020; Rasmussen, 2015; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2008). 
However, there is a paucity of empirical research that examines the quality of externally 
facilitated board performance evaluation and its possible determinants. 
 
Against this gap in the literature, the objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we ascertain 
whether the timing of adoption of externally facilitated board evaluation influences its quality. 
Second, given that the external facilitators are at the centre of externally facilitated board 
evaluation, we examine whether the types and independence of external facilitators influence 
the quality of board evaluation. Our study is informed by institutional theory which provides a 
useful theoretical lens to explore practice variation in CG mechanisms (Cuomo et al., 2016; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Adegbite, 2010). For instance, Zattoni & Cuomo (2008) has applied 
the institutional theory to explain the differences in the scope and stringency of CG codes 
adopted by civil law and common law countries. Institutional theory has also been used to 
explain differences in knowledge, expertise and interests of professional firms and how these 
lead to variation in their professional work (Muzio et al., 2013; Suddaby et al., 2009).  
 
Our analyses were performed using data from FTSE350 companies between 2009-2013, given 
that only the FTSE350 companies are subject to the provision of externally facilitated board 
performance evaluation.2 Based on the year of the first-time adoption of the externally 
facilitated board evaluation i.e., during 2009 – 2013, we classify sample firms into five year 
groups. Similarly, we classify sample firms into seven and three categories based on the types 
and independence of external facilitators, respectively. An exploratory approach was used to 
determine the types of external facilitators. The difference in the quality of externally facilitated 
board evaluation among these firm groups was then tested using inferential statistics. We 
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measure the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation across three dimensions using 
content analysis (Krippendorff, 2012; Neuendorf, 2002) of the statement on board evaluations 
in annual reports. The findings suggest that there is variation in the quality of externally 
facilitated board evaluation depending on the timing of adoption by firms. Furthermore, the 
quality differs among the group of firms categorised based on the types and levels of 
independence of external facilitators. However, this variation is not always statistically 
significant. Consistent with institutional theory, our study concludes that the timing of adoption 
and the characteristics of external professional firms create some variation in the quality of 
externally facilitated board evaluation.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature on board performance evaluation in the following ways. 
First, we provide evidence on the influence of the timing of adoption of externally facilitated 
board evaluation on its quality. Therefore, this study responds to the call of Cuomo et al. (2016) 
who invited scholars to explore practice variation in CG mechanisms across firms over time 
following institutional theory. Second, we contribute to the limited empirical literature on 
board evaluation (Booth and Nordberg, 2020) by showing some association between the types 
and independence of the external facilitators, and the quality of board evaluation. While many 
scholars (e.g., Minichilli et al., 2007; Long, 2006; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005) and policy 
initiatives (e.g., FRC, 2010) maintained that the characteristics and independence of external 
facilitators are critical, no prior study investigates the effect of types and independence of 
external facilitators on the quality of board evaluation. This study forges ahead discussions in 
this area. Finally, our findings are relevant to policymakers and stakeholders in the UK and 
countries that have incorporated externally facilitated board evaluation. Shareholders should 
especially be aware that characteristics of external professional firms appointed for the 
facilitation of board evaluation have a crucial bearing on the quality of implementation of board 
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evaluation. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the extant 
literature on board performance evaluation. In section 3, we motivate our research questions 
using a neo-institutional theoretical lens. Our research methodology is explained in section 4. 
Section 5 presents our findings and section 6 discusses our results, while presenting some 
implications for theory, practice, and future research. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
Board evaluation comprises the evaluation of the performance of the board as a cohesive unit, 
its committees and individual directors. The goal should be to increase the effectiveness of the 
whole board and not to target nor intimidate poor performers (Carey 1993; Adegbite 2010). 
The benefits of board evaluation include detection of specific deficiencies in existing board 
working arrangements/processes and suggesting remedial actions to rectify them (Ingley and 
van der Walt, 2002; Conger et al., 1998). This, in turn, enhances board task performance and 
its ability to monitor managerial and firm performance (Conger and Lawler, 2003). The 
associated challenges of board evaluation include the risk of triggering conflicts among 
directors and harming collegiality in the boardroom (Conger and Lawler, 2003; Heracleous and 
Luh Luh, 2002). However, researchers argued that when board performance evaluation is well 
executed, its benefits outweigh its associated challenges (Adegbite, 2015).  
 
Board evaluation can be via self-evaluation, which is when the board evaluates itself without 
any significant external help (Adegbite, 2010). Bassett (1998) argues that board self-regulation 
when done in an objective, measurable, and meaningful manner, is effective and should be a 
regular part of every board's routine. Indeed, the extant literature and past CG codes refer to 
self-evaluation as a common method to evaluate the board of directors (e.g., FRC, 2003; 
Conger and Lawler, 2003). Self-evaluation entails that the board chairperson, nomination 
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committee or an appropriate internal representative such as the company secretary administers 
the data collection to understand individual directors’ perception about the performance of the 
board and their own. It has the benefits of being less costly and offers confidentiality from 
outsiders (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). However, individual directors may not raise concerns 
and may provide the highest possible scores to themselves in self-evaluation (Booth and 
Nordberg, 2020; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). Research also shows that self-evaluation fails to 
result in any action for the improvement of board working arrangements and processes (Booth 
and Nordberg, 2020; Rasmussen, 2015). In sum, self-evaluation runs the risk of being a self-
serving exercise (Adegbite, 2015). To overcome these limitations, external board evaluation 
was recommended in the UK in 2010 (FRC, 2010) and subsequently, in many other countries 
(Nordberg and Booth, 2019). 
 
External board evaluation involves the engagement of an external consultant or professional to 
facilitate board evaluation (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). External facilitation, although more 
costly, reduces the self-serving bias (Long, 2006). Moreover, the external facilitators have a 
better experience, a higher exposure to other board practices and greater independence.  They 
are, therefore, in a better position to provide recommendations to rectify deficiencies in existing 
board arrangement and processes (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). Prior studies on external board 
performance evaluation have prescribed frameworks (Minichilli et al., 2007; Murphy and 
McIntyre, 2007; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Ingley and van der Walt, 
2002) such as the balanced scorecard (e.g., Epstein and Roy, 2004a; Epstein and Roy, 2004b). 
Kiel and Nicholson (2005) argued that a successful framework needs to consider (1) the 
objectives of the evaluation, (2) the group to be evaluated (e.g., whole board, board committees, 
and individual members), (3) the content of the evaluation, (4) the respondents of the 
evaluation, (5) the methods of data collection, (6) the evaluators, and (7) the use of results of 
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the evaluation. Murphy and Mclntyre (2007) integrate prior research on group dynamics and 
CG and advance a comprehensive model of board performance evaluation. Minichilli et al. 
(2007) further recommend a systematic approach to board evaluation by relating (a) the 
evaluators, (b) the content, (c) the addressee and other stakeholders for whom the board is 
evaluated, and (d) the methods of data collection.  
 
An appropriate approach to board evaluation should also ensure that (1) right evaluation 
processes are in place (Minichilli et al., 2007; Conger et al., 1998), (2) appropriate contents are 
evaluated (Nordberg and Booth, 2019; Minichilli et al., 2007; Conger et al., 1998) and (3) 
suitable remedial actions are taken based on the outcome of evaluation to enhance board task 
performances (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). In an effective board evaluation process, good 
planning should be the first step (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). This plan can consist of setting a 
clear objective (Minichilli et al., 2007; Conger et al., 1998), selecting an appropriate external 
facilitator (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005), ensuring the independence of the external facilitator 
(FRC, 2010) and setting important areas of board evaluation based on a meeting between the 
external facilitator and the internal authority responsible for board evaluation (Conger et al., 
1998; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). Then, the evaluation method needs to be comprehensive 
enough to retrieve relevant data (Minichilli et al., 2007). Finally, processing of data and 
dissemination of results could constitute the final step of the board evaluation process (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2005). Collier (2004) maintained that the board, its committees and individual 
directors should receive the board evaluation feedback. 
   
Furthermore, to achieve improved task performances from board evaluation, prior research and 
the UK CG Codes agreed that the content of an externally facilitated board evaluation should 
be appropriate. Minichilli et al. (2007) contend that the content of evaluation of the board as a 
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cohesive unit should focus on (i) board tasks, (ii) board membership, (iii) board culture and 
processes, and (iv) board leadership and structure. They also maintained that board committee 
evaluation should focus on the presence, composition and working style of board committees, 
while the FRC (2011, p. 11) recommended an appraisal of the overall effectiveness of board 
committees and their connection with the board. At the level of appraisal of individual 
directors, the literature recommends a review of individual director’s (1) knowledge of business 
and management (Nadler, 2004; Conger and Lawler, 2003; Lawler et al., 2002), (2) 
commitment to obtain information and devote time to take adequate preparation and attend 
board and committee meetings (Nordberg and Booth, 2019; Conger & Lawler, 2003), (3) 
contribution to board task performance (Minichilli et al., 2007; FRC, 2011) and (4) integrity 
(Nadler, 2004; Conger and Lawler, 2003). Finally, the achievement of the aim of board 
performance evaluation depends on the formulation of an action plan based on the outcomes 
of board evaluation (Sroufe and Naficy, 2005; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). The action plan 
should delineate future changes in board arrangements and processes, which are targeted at 
enhancing board task performance (FRC, 2011). However, the performance of these tasks 
largely depends on the quality and timeliness of the information that the board receives and the 
board’s knowledge about the business and industry (Conger et al., 1998).  The FRC (2011) 
therefore recommends that the outcome of board evaluations should be used to improve the 
effectiveness of board secretariat and design board support and development activities. 
 
While the foregoing shows that research on best practice recommendations regarding board 
evaluation is extant, empirical research in this area is scarce (Booth and Nordberg, 2020). More 
so, the few studies in this area frequently relies on survey or interview responses from a limited 
number of respondents, due to the difficulty in accessing high profile board members.  
However, scholarly interest in external board performance evaluation has been renewed 
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recently due to the recent policy initiative to improve board accountability in the UK (Booth 
and Nordberg 2020; Rasmussen, 2015; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2008). Dulewicz and Herbert 
(2008) surveyed 29 FTSE350 company secretaries and find that board performance evaluation 
results in significant changes in board membership. However, Rasmussen (2015) provides 
opposite evidence based on a comparative case-study of nine companies in Norway. She finds 
that seven companies take a minimalist approach where they neither apply an effective board 
evaluation process nor take any action based on the evaluation outcomes. Booth and Nordberg 
(2020) examine directors’ preference for self-evaluation versus externally facilitated board 
performance evaluation. They interviewed 17 directors from small companies and concluded 
that external board evaluation received increased acceptance among the directors as self-
evaluations fails to uncover the true performance of the board.  
 
In the main, empirical research on board evaluation have used a limited number of respondents 
(e.g., Rasmussen, 2015) or respondents from small companies which are not subject to 
externally facilitated board evaluation (e.g., Booth and Nordberg, 2020) and thereby, lacking 
sufficient scope as well as generalisability in their findings. Moreover, prior literature fails to 
investigate the effect of timing of adoption as well as types and independence of the external 
facilitators on the quality of board evaluation, especially following a recent regulatory change. 
Our study addresses these gaps in empirical literature by documenting the difference in the 
quality of externally facilitated board evaluation based on the timing of its adoption and the 
types and independence of the external facilitators employed.  
 
3.0 Theoretical framework and research questions 
While prior literature promoted externally facilitated board evaluation as a mechanism to 
improve board efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Nordberg and Booth, 2019; Minichilli et al., 
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2007), the recent recommendation of externally facilitated board evaluation in the UK emerged 
from a CG review initiated to restore an institutional legitimacy crisis. Therefore, an 
institutional theory lens helps us in our objective of explaining practice variation in the 
implementation of externally facilitated board evaluation.  
 
Institutional theory suggests that the timing of adoption of a new practice is associated with the 
variation in the implementation of the practice (Westphal et al., 1997; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983). Classical institutional theorists maintained that efficiency (rational) reasons govern 
early adoption, and social legitimation reasons direct later adoption (Westphal et al., 1997; 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Okike and Adegbite, 2012). Also, early-adopting organizations 
motivated by efficiency reasons implement the new practices more comprehensively (Zattoni 
& Cuomo, 2008). Conversely, later adopting organizations acting to achieve and maintain 
legitimacy implement the new practices symbolically (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2008), a process that DiMaggio and Powel (1983) called an institutional isomorphism. 
Institutional isomorphism can be of three kinds, namely: 1) coercive isomorphism exerted by 
regulators and dominant stakeholders; 2) mimetic isomorphism originating from goal 
ambiguity or institutional uncertainty; and 3) normative isomorphism stemming from 
professional and trade associations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Sobhan, 2016). This argument has been supported in prior empirical studies of 
the adoption of CG codes across countries (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008) and CEO long-term 
incentive plan (Westphal and Zajac, 1994).   
 
Alternative arguments, however, suggest that later adopters face fewer uncertainties about the 
benefits and characteristics of a practice as they have an opportunity to observe and assess the 
benefits gained by the early adopters (Jacobs et al., 2016). Also, later adopters have better 
11 
 
information and knowledge about the practice which they can acquire from the experience of 
early adopters (Terlaak and Gong, 2008) as well as from external sources (e.g., consultants) 
(Ritchie and Melnyk, 2012).  Moreover, later adopters get more time to assess the alignment 
between their cultural and political aspects and characteristics of the new practice (Ansari et 
al., 2010). As a result, later adopters are better equipped to implement the practice more 
efficiently and extensively. Consistent with this argument, prior empirical evidence shows that 
early adopters implement the new practice less comprehensively than later adopters (e.g., Fiss, 
et al., 2012; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009).  
 
The recommendation of externally facilitated board evaluation is unique as companies are 
subject to comply or explain non-compliance with it every three years (FRC, 2010; 2018). This 
CG provision, therefore, offers additional discretion to companies regarding the timing of its 
adoption. While prior literature promoted externally facilitated board evaluation as a 
mechanism to improve board efficiency/effectiveness (e.g., Nordberg and Booth, 2019; 
Minichilli et al., 2007), the process of emergence and incorporation of the recommendation in 
the UK CG code suggests that companies are subject to a high level of isomorphic pressures to 
adopt it. Normative pressures are intensified due to its incorporation in the UK CG Code – 
2010 as well as subsequent codes by the FRC (Sobhan, 2014; Adegbite et al., 2011). Moreover, 
the revision of listing regimes to include the recommendation of externally facilitated board 
evaluation heightened coercive isomorphic pressures (Sobhan and Bose, 2019; Sobhan, 2016). 
Most of the institutional investors who responded to the Walker Review and the revision of the 
earlier UK Combined Code advocated externally facilitated board evaluation as a device to 
improve the degree of objectivity of board effectiveness reviews.3 This preference of active 
investors heightened coercive and mimetic isomorphic pressures for compliance (Sobhan, 
2016; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). However, there were no regulatory guidance for 
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the implementation of externally facilitated board evaluation when it came into effect on 29 
June 2010. The FRC’s guidelines on board effectiveness issued in 2011 also did not feature 
much on the process of assessment and the characteristics of external facilitators. Moreover, 
the market for external facilitation has been underdeveloped (FRC, 2009, p. 23).  
 
As a result, while early adopters may have an intention to the practice more extensively, they 
may face a high level of institutional uncertainty because of lack of guidance, knowledge-base 
and established external facilitators. This uncertainty may, however, provide an opportunity 
for late adopters to model their practice on the experience of early adopters and implement 
externally facilitated board evaluation more comprehensively. We, therefore, apply a dynamic 
analysis to examine how the quality of externally facilitated board review has evolved. Thus, 
our first research question is as follows: 
 
RQ1 Is the timing of first-time adoption of externally facilitated board evaluation 
associated with the quality of its implementation? 
 
An agentic turn within neo-institutional theory acknowledges the agency and interests of 
professional firms as a causal agent of institutional change (Muzio et al., 2013; Greenwood et 
al., 2002; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012). Professional firms within the institutional field of a 
profession differ in knowledge and capabilities (Suddaby et al., 2009), thus creating a variation 
in their conduct and the quality of their professional work (Malhotra and Morris, 2009). In the 
case of externally facilitated board evaluation, external facilitators could be regarded as 
important professional agents. Prior exploratory research suggests that the market for external 
facilitation is underdeveloped (FRC, 2009, p. 23) and alternative types of professionals and 
professional firms such as board effectiveness consultancies, professional service firms, as well 
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as recruiting and search firms offer external facilitation (Chambers, 2017). These 
professionals/professional firms differ regarding ownership, expert knowledge, scope of 
operation and the range of services offered (Chambers, 2017). This variation in the 
characteristics of external facilitators may have a bearing on the quality of external facilitation 
of board review. Thus, our second research question is as follows: 
 
RQ2 Are the types of external facilitators associated with the variability in the quality 
of implementation of externally facilitated board evaluation? 
 
Moreover, due to the shift in a profession’s logic from a trustee to a commercial one (Muzio et 
al., 2013; Suddaby et al., 2007), an increased conflict of interests hinders professional 
judgments and quality of professional work (Suddaby et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2006). Many 
researchers and regulatory agencies, therefore, endorsed independence as a critical instrument 
to avoid conflict of interests (e.g., Sikka, 2015; Moore et al., 2006) and increase the objectivity 
of board evaluation (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2007). The FRC’s (2010) 
recommendation to disclose any relationship between the company and external facilitators 
also suggests that the independence of external facilitators is a critical element that can 
influence objectivity. The Walker Review emphasized the complete independence of the 
external facilitators to avoid conflict of interests.4 We aim to shed light on whether the degree 
of independence of external professional firms engaged in facilitation influence the quality of 
evaluation. Thus, our third research question is as follows: 
 
RQ3 Is the independence of external facilitators associated with the quality of 




4.0 Research methodology 
4.1 Sample 
The Walker Review was commissioned in February 2009 with its initial conclusion and 
recommendations published in July 2009. Therefore, we initially selected FTSE350 firms in 
the UK on 30 June 2009. There were 355 firms on 30 June 2009. We excluded equity 
and property investment trust companies (70 firms), as these companies are subject to different 
CG standards. Additional 71 companies were excluded as these firms remained in the FTSE350 
index for less than three consecutive accounting periods since 29 June 2010, which was the 
date when externally facilitated board evaluation came into effect and thus, these firms were 
not subject to comply with the recommendation, thus leaving us with 214 firms. Another 19 
firms failed to comply with the recommendation of an externally facilitated board evaluation 
within consecutive three accounting periods from 29 June 2010. Therefore, the final sample 
consisted of 195 firms. Table 1 summarises our sample selection for this study. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2 Classification of external facilitators 
We applied an exploratory approach to classify the external facilitators, due to limited 
information (Chambers, 2017). The names of the facilitators were retrieved from statements on 
board evaluation in the annual reports of companies. Out of 195 firms, 164 firms disclosed the 
names of their external facilitators. We then used internet search to locate their websites. If 
there exists a webpage of the external facilitator, we saved the mission statement and main 
services provided into a Microsoft Word file. If no relevant website was found, the nature of 
business (SIC) was retrieved from the Company House. Two independent coders classified the 
external facilitators based on mission statements and/or nature of business (SIC). The 
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descriptions of primary services provided, where available, were further used to confirm the 
initial classification. The two coders discussed any disagreements and reached an agreement 
where possible. If the two coders failed to reach an agreement or sufficient information about 
the external facilitators was not available, the external facilitators were classified as ‘Other 
organizations’. Using this procedure, we were able to sort 45 different external facilitators, 
providing services to 164 sample firms, into six types. Based on the disclosure in the annual 
reports of our sample firms, the external facilitators were classified as independent if there is 
no other business relationship with the company, non-independent if other business 
relationship exists, and ‘dubious relationship’ if the company does not make it clear.    
 
4.3 Content analysis  
A content analysis (Krippendorff, 2012; Neuendorf, 2002) of the statements on board 
evaluation in the annual reports was employed to measure these three dimensions of quality of 
external board evaluation: (1) the process used, (2) the content covered, and (3) the suggestions 
provided. These dimensions were selected based on the board evaluation frameworks 
prescribed in prior literature (e.g., Nordberg and Booth, 2019; Minichilli et al., 2007; Murphy 
and McIntyre, 2007; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Epstein and Roy, 
2004a; Epstein and Roy, 2004b; Conger et al., 1998). 
  
The content analysis of CG statements in annual reports is widely used in prior literature in 
researching the quality of both compliance (e.g., Arcot et al., 2010; Akkermans et al., 2007; v 
Werder et al., 2005) and non-compliance (e.g., Lepore et al., 2018; Shrives and Brennan, 2015) 
with CG codes. The content analysis is also widely used in financial accounting literature for 
researching accounting disclosures and narratives (e.g., Unerman, 2,000; Aerts and Cormier, 
2009; Hooks and van Staden, 2011). The content analysis allows repeatability (Krippendorf, 
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2012) and enables researchers to make valid, quantifiable inferences based on narrative 
documents (Neuendorf, 2002). Concern has, however, been raised about reliability (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007; Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005), and to improve our reliability, we selected 
disclosure categories from well-grounded relevant literature, used empirically driven coding 
instruments, and coding was done by two experienced researchers, independently (Guthrie et 
al., 2003; Milne and Adler, 1999). 
 
This study adopted an empirically driven approach to the design of the instruments of the 
content analysis. Based on prior theoretical and practice-based literature on board evaluation, 
we designed the coding instruments for each of the three quality dimensions (Appendices 1 – 
4). Once the coding instruments were designed, we analysed each sentence of the statements 
on board evaluation within the annual reports of 20 companies (Milne and Adler, 1999) and 
applied an appropriate scale to score each sentence for quality. The use of sentences as both 
coding and measurement units is recommended to enhance completeness, reliability and 
meaning of the data (Unerman, 2,000; Milne and Adler, 1999). Based on the results of this 
initial coding, we made necessary modifications to the coding instruments.  
 
We then independently coded the annual reports of another 55 companies. Cronbach’s (1951) 
alpha was performed to ensure inter-coder reliability (Guthrie et al., 2003; Milne and Adler, 
1999). The alpha coefficients, although varying among board evaluation process, the content 
of board evaluation and the suggestions provided by the external facilitators for improvement, 
highlighted a good level of inter-coder reliability. We then coded the board evaluation 
statements in the annual reports of the remaining companies that conducted an externally 




4.3.1 Content analysis of board evaluation process 
Relying on prior literature (Minichilli et al., 2007; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; Conger et al., 
1998), and following the initial coding of 20 statements on board evaluation, a final coding 
guideline for the board evaluation process was developed as presented in Appendix 1. It 
captures (1) sound planning (4 items), (2) use of comprehensive data collection methods to 
retrieve relevant data as detailed below, (3) communication of evaluation feedback to board, 
committees and individual directors (8 items), and (4) designing of an agreed-upon action plan 
to improve board task and practices (1 item). We used a binary score for most of these items 
(Beattie and Thomson, 2007). However, we scored three elements on a different scale, where 
data collection method was the most important among them.     
 
Similarly, we identified nine data collection methods used in board evaluation: one to one 
discussion, standardised questionnaire, tailored questionnaire, benchmarking against the best 
practice or CG codes, document analysis, structured interview, semi-structured interview, 
participant observation and psychometric testing. All methods of appraisal suffer from certain 
limitations (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005) and thus, we only rank methods if one method is clearly 
superior to others (Milne and Adler, 1999). For instance, we gave a lower score to a structured 
interview compared to a semi-structured interview because a structured interview does not 
offer the opportunity to further probe. Moreover, board evaluation based on input from 
directors alone may run the risk of becoming highly subjective and self-serving (Conger et al., 
1998; Epstein and Roy, 2004a). Our coding of evaluation methods thus captured input from a 
range of respondents. Where the company did not disclose the respondents specifically, then 
the members of the board were presumed to be the respondents. Furthermore, in line with 
Ingley and van der Walt (2002) and Garratt (1997), we assume that the combination of different 
assessment methods achieves more robust results. Hence, when the external facilitator applied 
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different methods of data collection, the relevant company-specific score was derived by 
totalling the scores assigned to different methods. A guide used for coding the methods data 
collection for board evaluation is presented in Appendix 2. The Cronbach’s (1951) alpha 
coefficient for board evaluation process was calculated to be 0.91, which highlights a good 
level of inter-coder reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999). 
 
4.3.2 Content analysis of the content of board evaluation 
With regards to the content of board evaluation, the coding process covered the performance 
evaluation of (1) the board as a cohesive unit (Conger and Lawler, 2003; Minichilli et al., 
2007), (2) board committees (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005) and (3) individual members of the board 
(Conger and Lawler, 2003; Minichilli et al., 2007). Following the content of board evaluation 
as a cohesive unit suggested by Minichilli et al. (2007), our coding instrument included the 
assessment of board’s (i) tasks performance (4 items), (ii) membership (4 items), (iii) culture 
and processes (5 items), and (iv) leadership and structure (5 items). Using the extant theoretical 
and empirical literature on board task performance (Machold and Farquhar, 2013; Minichilli 
et al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2006; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989), we developed a list of actions for each of (a) the strategic tasks, (b) 
the monitoring and control tasks and (c) the networking tasks (see Appendix 3). However, 
several companies in the initial sample of 20 companies did not elucidate what individual board 
task they have assessed in their board evaluation. Thus, we extended our coding scheme to 
include an item for the existence of a statement that the externally facilitated board evaluation 
‘assessed the board effectiveness in performing its tasks’ (Epstein and Roy, 2004b). We scored 
each sentence based on whether it provides a general statement of the assessment of overall 
board task effectiveness, or alternatively, on each of the three broad board tasks or individual 
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activities associated with them. See subsection one of section one in Appendix 3 for the coding 
scheme and coding examples for board tasks. 
 
For board membership content, our final coding scheme includes (1) board diversity, (2) board 
balance – mix of skills, experience, knowledge and capabilities, (3) board tenure, and (4) board 
independence (FRC, 2010; Minichilli et al., 2007; Ingley and van Der Walt, 2003; Conger et 
al., 1998). Here board diversity is used to capture the demographic diversity such as gender, 
nationality and cultural background of the directors. We scored each sentence based on how 
many board diversity and balance attributes are assessed. See subsection two of section one in 
Appendix 3 for the coding scheme and associated coding examples. 
 
To assess board culture and processes, the third element of the evaluation of the board as a 
cohesive unit, our coding instrument captures board culture, which refers to aspects such as (i) 
board dynamics and (ii) board cohesiveness (Nadler, 2004) and board process operationalised 
by items such as (i) board decision-making process (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Wang and 
Ong, 2005), (ii) quality of board information and papers (Collier, 2004; Sonnenfeld, 2002)  and 
(iii) board time management (FRC, 2011). While several companies in our initial sample 
provided brief disclosures and mentioned assessment of ‘board culture, board process’, others 
went further and made relatively detailed disclosures. To capture this detailed disclosure, we 
scored each sentence based on the number of elements of board culture and board process 
mentioned in the sentence. See subsection three of section one in Appendix 3.  
 
The final element of the content of evaluation of the board as a cohesive unit is board leadership 
and structure. Based on prior literature, our initial coding scheme included aspects such as (i) 
board terms of reference (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005); (ii) policies relating to board support 
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(Kiel and Nicholson, 2005); (iii) board size (Linck et al., 2008), (iv) board composition (Linck 
et al., 2008), (v) performance of chairman of the board (Neubauer, 1997). None of the 20 
companies that were coded initially disclosed board size as an element of evaluation. Regarding 
the evaluation of the chairman’s performance, several companies disclosed that their board 
evaluation reviewed specific leadership aspect of the chairman (Leblanc, 2005; FRC, 2011). 
On the other hand, the chairman’s performance was not subject to external evaluation for many 
companies. Hence, we adjusted our coding scheme to reflect these empirics (See subsection 
four of section one in Appendix 3). 
 
The evaluation of board committees is recommended to be an integral part of board evaluation 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). This initial coding scheme includes an evaluation of (1) the overall 
effectiveness of board committees (FRC, 2011), (2) connection of board committees with the 
main board (FRC, 2011; Long, 2006), and (3) structure and composition of board committees 
(Long, 2006; Minichilli et al., 2007). However, we found that several of our initial 20 
companies did not evaluate board committees at all. Moreover, some companies evaluated all 
board committees while others evaluated a selection of board committees. Furthermore, several 
companies evaluated board committee content that were not recommended in prior literature 
(e.g., terms of reference of the committees). Hence, our final coding scheme for board 
committee evaluation was adjusted based on these empirics (see section two of Appendix 3).  
  
The final level of board evaluation is the evaluation of the individual director performance 
(Nordberg and Booth, 2019; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; Conger et al., 19982).  Our initial 
coding scheme for this included (1) knowledge of business and management, (2) commitment 
to their roles, (3) contribution to board task performance, and (4) integrity of the directors 
(Nadler, 2004; Conger & Lawler, 2003). However, our coding of the preliminary 20 companies 
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revealed that many companies did not evaluate the performance of individual directors. 
Moreover, companies that did evaluate the performance of individual directors were only 
briefly concerned about the evaluation of commitment to their roles and contribution to board 
task performance, probably because these two items are highlighted in the FRC (2011) 
guideline. Hence, the individual director’s knowledge of business and management, and 
integrity were deleted from our initial coding scheme (see section three of Appendix 3. The 
alpha coefficient was calculated to be 0.88, which highlights a satisfactory level of inter-coder 
reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999; Cronbach 1951).  
 
4.3.3 Content analysis of suggestions for improvement  
Our aim here is to capture the number of suggestions provided by the external facilitators for 
the improvement of board task performance. Therefore, our unit of measurement is the 
recommended action. Based on prior theoretical literature (Machold and Farquhar, 2013; 
Minichilli et al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Van Den Heuvel et al., 2006; Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Zahra and Pearce, 1989), we developed a list of actions for each of (a) the strategic tasks, 
(b) the monitoring and control tasks, (c) the networking tasks. In the case of dilemmas, we 
relied on the theory that appears more likely to ask for a particular action. One example is an 
increase in board independence. Both agency and resource dependency theory require greater 
board independence. However, agency theory makes a stronger case in favour of a more 
independent board. Hence, an increase in the board independence suggestion is regarded as an 
action leading to better monitoring of task performance. Other suggestions that are difficult to 
fit into a particular board task but may help the board of directors better perform all tasks were 
categorized into two groups: (1) suggestions leading to improved effectiveness of board 




A final coding scheme containing a total of 30 actions: (a) the strategic tasks (4 actions), (b) 
the monitoring and control tasks (11 actions), (c) the networking tasks (3 actions), (4) 
suggestions leading to improved effectiveness of board secretariat (5 actions) and (e) 
suggestions leading to better board support and development (7 actions) was developed. We 
then coded each recommended action using a binary indicator (1 for presence and 0 for 
absence) (Brennan, 2001) (see Appendix 4). The alpha was calculated to be 0.76, which 
highlights a satisfactory level of inter-coder reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999; Cronbach 
1951). The individual company score for the evaluation process, the content of evaluation and 
suggestions for improvement of board practices was scaled by the maximum possible score of 
38, 43 and 30 respectively to ensure better comparison among groups. 
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
When the sample firms were divided into groups based on the timing of adoption of externally 
facilitated board evaluation, types and independence of external facilitators, there were unequal 
group size. Moreover, the test of homogeneity of variances was not always rejected. Hence, we 
used Welch Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to compare the means of each the groups of firms. 
When Welch ANOVA is statistically significant, we used the Games-Howell post hoc test to 
test for the differences in means among all possible combination of groups of firms. Fir brevity, 
we only report the combination of groups of firms where the difference between means is 
statistically significant.  
 
5.0 Results 
5.1 Timing of adoption and the quality of external board evaluation 
As mentioned in section 4.1, 195 out of 214 FTSE350 firms (91.12%) complied with the 
recommendation of externally facilitated board evaluation. Table II presents the distribution of 
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these firms based on their timing of adoption between 2009 and 2013. Table II shows that the 
number of firms, which adopted externally facilitated board evaluation for the first-time 
increased from 27 in 2009 to 47 in 2012. The sharp escalation in the first-time adoption from 
2009 to 2010 and subsequent years showed the impact of the UK CG Code - 2010, which came 
into effect on 29 June 2010. Also, a reduced number of FTSE350 firms adopted externally 
facilitated board evaluation for the first time in 2013 as most of them already complied with 
the recommendation in earlier years.  
 
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
Our first research question asks whether the timing of first-time adoption of externally 
facilitated board evaluation is associated with its quality. The results are summarized in Table 
II. The sample average scores for the evaluation process, the content evaluated and the 
suggestions provided for improvement of board practices are 0.20, 0.18 and 0.07 respectively. 
The detailed analysis reveals that 83 firms out of 195 compliant firms (42.56%) did not 
implement a single action based on the suggestions of external facilitators. This suggests poor 
quality of the implementation of external board evaluation (see also: Rasmussen 2015). 
However, the average scores for all three quality dimensions exhibited an increasing trend from 
2009 to 2011. The average scores for all three quality dimensions for 2011 are also higher than 
their grant means. This may suggests that institutional uncertainty resulting from the lack of 
guidance from regulatory and professional authorities, knowledge-base and absence of 
established external facilitators diminished over time, perhaps after publication and 
dissemination of guidelines on board evaluation by the professional associations (e.g., IoD, 
2010) and regulatory agencies (i.e., FRC, 2011). The average scores for all quality dimensions, 
however, significantly declined from 2011 to 2012 and then slightly increased in 2013. The 
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firms that adopted for the first-time in 2013 have received the highest number of suggestions 
for improvement of board practices, but they have lower average scores for evaluation process 
and content than firms that adopted in 2011. 
 
The ANOVA results indicate that the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation across 
all three dimensions is significantly different among the firms that adopted the practice in 2009 
to 2013.  The p-values for the quality dimensions of process applied, content evaluated, and 
suggestions provided were 0.001, 0.029 and 0.030, respectively. These results suggest that the 
quality of externally facilitated board evaluation differs among firms based on the timing of 
their first-time adoption. We further used Games-Howell post hoc test of multiple comparisons 
for the five year groups (2009-2013). Firms that adopted in 2011 have a significantly higher 
level of quality across all three dimensions than the firms that adopted in 2009. The p-values 
for mean difference between these two groups of firms on process applied, content evaluated, 
and suggestions were 0.001, 0.005 and 0.089, respectively. Moreover, firms that adopted in 
2013 have received significantly higher number of suggestions from the external facilitators 
than firms that adopted in 2009 (p=0.071). The findings, however, failed to indicate any other 
statistically significant difference in the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation 
between the groups of firms that adopted in 2009 and in 2010, 2012 or 2013. 
 
5.2 Types of facilitators and quality of external board evaluation 
The second research question (RQ2) investigated whether the external facilitator types are 
associated with the quality of board evaluation. Table III presents the results. The average 
quality scores across all three dimensions are above the grant means for firms that engaged 
board effectiveness consultancies. In contrast, the means of the evaluation process applied, and 
suggestions provided for improvement are lower than sample means when the firms appointed 
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headhunting and search firms or headhunting and leadership consultancies. Similarly, the 
means of all quality dimensions are lower than their grant means when the external facilitators 
are unknown. The expertise and specialized knowledge of board effectiveness consultancies 
appears to be an explanatory factor for the relatively better-quality implementation. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
 
Table III shows that there is a statistically significant difference regarding the evaluation 
process applied between the groups of firms that engaged different types of external facilitators 
(p = 0.003). The ANOVA results, however, fail to indicate any statistically significant 
difference regarding the content of board evaluation and suggestions provided for improvement 
between groups of firms that engaged different types of external facilitators. The p-values for 
these dimensions were 0.417 and 0.570, respectively. The results of Games-Howell post hoc 
test of multiple comparisons show that firms that engaged board effectiveness consultancies 
have a statistically significant higher average quality in term of the process applied than firms 
that appointed professional service firms, headhunting and leadership consultancies, and 
unknown external facilitators.  
 
5.3 Independence of facilitators and quality of external board evaluation 
On the independence of external facilitators and the quality of implementation of externally 
facilitated board evaluation (RQ3), the descriptive statistics suggests that firms that engaged 
independent external facilitators have the highest average scores across all three-quality 
dimensions (Table IV). In contrast, firms that appointed non-independent facilitators have the 
least average scores for evaluation process applied and received a lower average number of 
suggestions for future improvement than firms that engaged independent facilitators (Table 
IV). Similarly, when the relationship between the external facilitators and the firms is dubious, 
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the average scores across all three-quality dimensions are lower than the grant means (Table 
IV). The ANOVA results (Table IV) show that the means of the board evaluation and 
suggestions provided differ significantly based on whether the firms appointed external 
facilitators that are independent, non-independent, or have dubious relationships with the firms. 
The p-values for these dimensions were 0.0000 and 0.0159, respectively. However, the 
ANOVA results fail to indicate any significant difference regarding the content appraised in 
board evaluation among these external facilitator groups.  
 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
 
The results of multiple comparisons show that the independent external facilitators applied 
significantly better board evaluation process than non-independent ones (p=0.001) and the 
facilitators whose relationship with the firms is unclear (p = 0.005). However, the mean of the 
board evaluation process of non-independent external facilitators is not significantly different 
from those whose relationships with the firms is unknown. The independent ones recommend 
a higher number of suggestions for further improvement of board task performances than those 
whose relationship with the firms is dismal (p=0.005). The mean of the number of 
recommendations for further improvement, although not statistically significantly different, is 
also higher than that of non-independent external facilitators. Overall, the results indicate that 
the external facilitators' independence matters for the quality of board evaluation. 
 
6.0 Discussion, implications and future research 
The incorporation of externally facilitated board evaluation into the UK CG Code - 2010 and 
in the subsequent UK CG Codes offers an exciting opportunity to investigate the quality of 
external board evaluation and its determinants. In this paper, using FTSE350 companies as a 
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sample and developing a measure of the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation, we 
examined the influence of the following on the quality of externally facilitated board 
evaluation: timing of adoption of external board evaluation, type of evaluators, and the 
independence of external facilitators. Our results show that the quality of externally facilitated 
board evaluation is an artefact created by the timing of first-time adoption and types and degree 
of independence of facilitators. This is a useful addition to the meagre literature in this space, 
which have mainly examined the pros and cons of self-versus externally facilitated board 
performance evaluation (e.g., Booth and Nordberg 2020; Rasmussen, 2015; Dulewicz and 
Herbert, 2008). Moreover, these prior studies investigate neither the quality of externally 
facilitated board evaluation nor its determinants. Our paper, developing a measure of the 
quality of external board evaluation and demonstrating some effects of the timing of adoption 
and types and degree of independence of external facilitators on it, augments the limited 
empirical research in this space (Booth and Nordberg, 2020). 
 
Our findings also have forge ahead an institutional theorising of external board evaluation. The 
possible effect of the timing of first-time adoption of externally facilitated board evaluation on 
its quality indicates an inverse U-shape relationship. This evidence completely supports the 
view of neither classical institutional theorists (Westphal et al., 1997; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983) who argue that early adopters embarking on efficiency reasons implement a new practice 
more comprehensively than later adopters. Moreover, the evident association between the 
independence of professional firms and the quality of board evaluation confirms that the 
existence of a conflict of interest could undermine the intended purpose of engaging an external 
professional. This evidence supports the view that when a conflict of interests emanating from 
other pecuniary relationships between the professional firms and their client companies, it 




The findings of this study are also relevant to proponents of externally facilitated board 
evaluation and policymakers. It appears that board evaluation consultancies applied more 
rigorous processes and provided a higher number of recommendations for improvement to 
board task performance. This is the same for firms that engaged independent external 
facilitators. These insights may suggest that the proponents (e.g., Walker, 2009) and regulators 
(e.g., FRC, 2011) should specify the types of external professionals who can be engaged as 
external facilitators for board evaluation and also, make the independence of external 
facilitators mandatory. Our study further provides insights to practitioners, particularly 
institutional investors who should consider the types and independence of facilitators when 
assessing the quality of board evaluation. Until the policymakers/regulators mandate the 
independence of facilitators, institutional investors could act as a watchdog to enforce it.   
 
In conclusion, this study measures the quality of externally facilitated board evaluation using 
content analysis of a large number of statements on board evaluation in annual reports. 
However, the disclosures in annual reports are influenced by managerial interests and firms’ 
cost-benefit analysis of such disclosures. For instance, companies may not disclose negative 
aspects of the evaluation (e.g., the number of suggestions received for further improvement of 
board practices) in their annual reports. No doubt, annual reports are considered as one of the 
vital and credible sources of data by users (Beattie et al., 2004) and are the basis on which 
formal decisions (e.g., investment decisions) are taken. However, future research may use the 
content analysis of the statements on external board evaluation in the annual reports in addition 




Moreover, this study classifies external facilitators based on their main services offerings. 
However, the quality of external facilitation may also depend on the size of the professional 
firms (e.g., large professional service firms versus single person controlled small firms), and 
experience, knowledge and expertise of the person who led the facilitation. Therefore, our 
classification of external facilitators could be improved in future studies which may explore 
the association between more specific types of external facilitators and the quality of board 
performance evaluation. Finally, future research could also examine the effect of the quality of 
externally facilitated board evaluation on outcome variables (e.g., firm performance). Also, the 
consequences of the quality of board evaluation have not been investigated in the current nor 
in any previous study. In addressing this gap, future studies could use the coding instruments 




1. The recommendation is incorporated intact in all subsequent UK Corporate Governance 
Codes. For example. The UK Corporate Governance Code – 2018 stated the following. 
Evaluation of the board of FTSE 350 companies should be externally facilitated at least every 
three years (FRC, 2018: Provision 21). 
2. This provision for externally facilitated board evaluation applies to FTSE350 companies 
who are expected to conduct this review at least once every three years (FRC, 2010: B 6.2). 
Because of divergence in accounting periods followed by the FTSE350 companies, some firms 
could remain compliant with this recommendation if they conduct an externally facilitated 
performance evaluation of board of directors as late as 31 December 2013. Hence, the adoption 
of the externally facilitated performance evaluation of board of directors is in its formative 
stages. 
3. For instance, Railpen Investments (2009, p. 5) in their comment letter to the Walker Review 
stated the following. “We recommended that the FRC look to introduce a requirement for an 
independent, external evaluation process to be undertaken periodically, say, at least once in 
every three years in order that shareholders can have confidence in the validity and stringency 
of the process.” 
4. For instance, FairPensionTM (2009, p. 16) made following suggestions to the Walker 
Review. “We think that in no circumstances should the external evaluator have any other 
business relationship with the company or be permitted to have one for a substantial period (at 
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Table I  
Sample selection process 
  No. of firms 
FTSE 350 companies on 30 June 2009 355 
Less: Equity and real estate investment trust company 70 
 285 
Less: Firms do not remain in the FTSE 350 for three accounting 
period since June 2010 71 
 214 
Less: Firms that do not adopt externally facilitated board evaluation 
within three full accounting period since June 2010 19 




Table II              
Quality of externally facilitated board performance evaluation by the timing of first-time adoption 




Process applied Content evaluated Suggestions for 
improvement 
  Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
2009 27 0.15 0.08 0 0.26 0.14 0.10 0 0.44 0.05 0.06 0 0.17 
2010 41 0.19 0.09 0 0.34 0.16 0.09 0 0.35 0.06 0.08 0 0.27 
2011 42 0.23 0.06 0.1 0.37 0.23 0.11 1 0.42 0.09 0.07 0 0.23 
2012 47 0.19 0.10 0 0.42 0.17 0.10 0 0.47 0.06 0.07 0 0.30 
2013 38 0.21 0.11 0 0.47 0.19 0.10 0.02 0.42 0.10 0.09 0 0.40 
Total 195 0.20 0.09 0 0.47 0.18 0.11 0 0.46 0.07 0.08 0 0.40 
Significance of overall difference across 
years of adoption p = 0.001 p = 0.029 p = 0.030 
Pairwise differences 
2009 versus 2011 
2009 versus 2013 
p = 0.001 
- 
p = 0.050 
 
p = 0.089 
p = 0.071 
This table presents the quality of implementation of externally facilitated board evaluation based on timing of first-time adoption. 
Quality is measured across three dimensions: the process applied, content evaluated, and suggestions provided for improvement. They 
are derived using Appendix 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Pro-active adopters; Early adopters; Later adopters; Followers and Laggards 
respectively indicate firms that adopted externally facilitated board evaluation for the first time in financial year ended in 2009, 2010, 




Table III                           
Quality of first-time adoption of externally facilitated board evaluation  by types of external facilitators 
Types of external facilitators 
Firms 
(n=195) 
Process applied Content evaluated Suggestions for improvement 
 
  Mean S. D Min Max Mean S. D Min Max Mean S. D Min Max 
Board effectiveness consultancies  62 0.24 0.08 0.10 0.47 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.42 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.30 
Professional services firms 42 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.47 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.40 
Headhunting and search firms 11 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.32 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.42 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.16 
Headhunting and leadership 
consultancies 
18 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.47 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.16 
Organisational and leadership 
development consultancies 
21 0.21 0.11 0.00 0.42 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.44 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.30 
Other organizations 10 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.34 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.37 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.23 
Unknown external facilitators 31 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.15 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.23 
Total complied 195 0.2 0.09 0.00 0.47 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.47 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.40 
Significance of overall difference across 
types of facilitators p=0.003 
p=0.417 p =0.570 
Pairwise differences 
Board effectiveness consultancies versus 
professional service firms 
Board effectiveness consultancies versus 
headhunting and leadership consultancies 
Board effectiveness consultancies versus 









Quality is measured across three dimensions: the process applied, content evaluated, and suggestions provided for improvement. They are 
derived using Appendix 1, 3 and 4 respectively. The external facilitators are classified as independent if there is no other business relationship 
between the external facilitator and the company, otherwise as non-independent.   If the company does not make a clear statement on their 





Quality of first-time adoption of externally facilitated board evaluation by levels of independence of external facilitators  




Process applied Content evaluated Suggestions for improvement 
   Mean S. D Min Max Mean S. D Min Max Mean S. D Min Max 
Independent 121 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.47 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.42 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.40 
Non-independent  30 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.32 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.47 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.30 
Relationship is not disclosed 44 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.44 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.23 
Total complied 195 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.47 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.46 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.40 
Significance of overall difference across 
levels of independence of facilitators p=0.000 p = 0.165 p = 0.012 
Pairwise differences 
Independent versus non-independent 
Independent versus Relationship is not 
disclosed 















Quality is measured across three dimensions: the process applied, content evaluated, and suggestions provided for improvement. They are 
derived using Appendix 1, 3 and 4 respectively. The external facilitators are classified as independent if there is no other business relationship 
between the external facilitator and the company, otherwise as non-independent.   If the company does not make a clear statement on their 







Coding Scheme for Process of Board Evaluation 
Items Coding Examples from Annual Reports 
1. Planning    
An objective of an externally 
facilitated board evaluation is 
stated. 
1=Yes, 0 = No 1 = In order to enhance the Board’s performance and effectiveness, we engaged 
an external consultant (A.G.Barr plc, 2014) 
Selection process of the external 
facilitator is described. 
1=Yes, 0 = No 1 = Three candidates were selected from a number of companies. They were 
then invited to make presentations to the Chairman and the Senior Independent 
Director, following which IBE were engaged (Henderson Group plc, 2011). 
The external facilitator is 
independent. 
2 = Independent 2= Dr Long has no other connection with the company (GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 
2011). 
1= Not independent 1 = Schneider Ross was appointed to conduct an evaluation of the Board and its 
committees, having previously provided inclusive leadership training to the 
Company in 2009 (National Grid plc, 2013). 
0 = Relationship is not 
made clear  
A discussion between the external 
facilitator and an internal authority 
responsible for board evaluation. 
1=Yes, 0 = No 1 = The Chairman agreed the scope of the review, which included individual 
interviews with each Board member and attendance and observation at the 
April 2013 Board meeting (Genus plc, 2013). 
2. Methods of data collection used  Appendix 2  
3. Dissemination of results   
A preliminary report is prepared and 
discussed with an internal authority 
responsible for board evaluation. 
1=Yes, 0 = No 1 = The outcome of the review was first discussed with the Chairman, the 
Deputy Chairman and the Company Secretary collectively (Inmarsat plc, 2013) 
A final evaluation report is prepared 
and delivered. 
1=Yes, 0 = No 1 = The findings of this external evaluation process were presented in report 
format (Michael Page International plc, 2013) 
The evaluation results are released 
to all board members. 
1=Yes, 0 = No The results of the evaluation were shared with all members of the Board 
(A.G.Barr plc, 2014) 
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The evaluation results are discussed 
in a board meeting. 
2 = In presence of the 
facilitator 
2 = Lintstock presented this report to the Board in February 2012 (HomeServe 
plc, 2012) 
 
1= Without presence of 
the facilitator 
1 = The findings of the evaluation were then discussed by the Board as a whole 
(Hiscox plc, 2011). 
 
0 = No discussion of 
evaluation results held  
The feedback on board committee 
effectiveness is delivered to 
respective chairmen. 
1=Yes, 0 = No 1= The reports relating to the Board committees will be discussed with the 
chairmen of these committees (Kier Group plc, 2011) 
Feedback on board committees is 
discussed in respective board 
committee meetings. 
1=Yes, 0 = No 1 = In addition, all three committees agreed to take actions based on evaluation 
of their performance (ICAP plc, 2012) 
The Chairman used the facilitator’s 
feedback on individual director's 
performance. 
1=Yes, 0 = No The individual Director’s performance reports were provided to the Chairman, 
which the Chairman then discussed with each Director as appropriate (Aveva 
plc, 2014). 
The external facilitator's report 
informs the discussion between 
Senior Independent Director and 
other non-executive directors on the 
Chairman's performance. 
1=Yes, 0 = No After taking account of the results of the Chairman’s formal performance 
evaluation our Senior Independent Director provided feedback to the Chairman 
on a one-to-one basis (Imperial Tobacco Group plc, 2009). 
4. The board of directors determines 
a board development action plan 
based on external appraiser’s 
recommendations. 
1=Yes, 0 = No An action plan has been agreed by the Board to address the recommendations 





Coding scheme for method of data collection 






4 Board members, company secretary, 
executives and external stakeholders only. 
3 = Coefficient undertook detailed discussions with the Directors, 
the Company Secretary and the Divisional Chief Executives 
(Persimmon plc, 2012).                                                                                                                          
2= MWM undertaking individual consulations with each Board 
member and the Company Secretary on board performance 
(Vodafone Group plc, 2010).                                                                                                                            
1 = One-to-one discussions between each Director and the external 
consultant (Admiral Group plc, 2010). 
3 Board members, company secretary and 
executives only 
2 Board members and company secretary 
only 
1 Board members only 
Standardised 
questionnaire 
4 Board members, company secretary, 
executives and external stakeholders only. 
4 = .... including regular attendees and two external advisors, were 
invited to complete structured questionnaires (National Grid plc, 
2013).                                                                                       2 = the 
completion of comprehensive questionnaires in which Directors and 
the Company Secretary were asked to evaluate the Board 
(InterContinental Hotels Group plc, 2011).                                                                                
1 = The evaluation was conducted by the completion of detailed and 
comprehensive written survey questionnaires (A.G.Barr plc, 2013).                                                                                                                                                 
3 Board members, company secretary and 
executives only. 
2 Board members and company secretary 
only. 
1 




Board members, company secretary, 
executives and external stakeholders only. 
5 = ... then tailored questionnaires specifically for United Utilities, 
which were completed by all board members, committee members 
and by the senior managers ....by third party advisors to the various 
committees (United Utilities Group plc, 2012).                                                                                                               
2 = Questionnaires tailored to the specific circumstances of the 
Company were completed by each director on the Chairman, in 
relation to their own performance (Ladbrokes plc, 2010). 
4 Board members, company secretary and 
executives only. 
3 Board members and company secretary 
only. 
2 Board members only 
Benchmarking 1 Against the best practices and codes 1 = Performance was considered by reference to the objectives of the 
Board and its committees (Ashmore Group plc, 2012) 
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Document analysis 3 Board and committee papers as well as any 
other relevant documents 
3 = Office based review of Board and Committee documents, 
policies and procedures (Ferrexpo plc, 2013) 
 
2 Board and committee papers 2 = The evaluation also included a detailed review of Board and 
Committee papers (Antofagasta plc, 2013). 
 1 Board papers only 1 = together with a review of Board papers (Colt Group SA, 2011). 
Structured interview  4 Board members, company secretary, 
executives and external stakeholders only. 
4 =...followed by confidential structured interviews with the 
directors, the company secretary together with senior members of the 
management team and major shareholders (Grainger plc, 2011) 
 
3 Board members, company secretary and 
executives only. 
3 = followed by structured interviews of Directors and key 
executives with representatives from Egon Zehnder International 
(Barcleys plc, 2010) 
 
2 Board members and company secretary 
only. 
2 = each of the Directors and the Company Secretary were then 
individually interviewed using structured questions (Dairy Crest 
Group plc, 2012). 
 
1 Board members only Simon Osborne interviewed each of the Directors and the Chairman 




5 Board members, company secretary, 
executives and external stakeholders only.  
5 = ….and semi-structured interviews with all Directors, the 
Company Secretary and a selection of senior managers, shareholders 
and the Company’s stockbrokers (Informa plc, 2010). 
 
4 Board members, company secretary and 
executives only. 
4 = undertook a series of semi-structured one-on-one interviews with 
the Chairman, each member of the Board and the General Counsel 
and Company Secretary (Compass Group plc, 2013). 
 
3 Board members and company secretary 
only.  
3 = The evaluation consisted of individual semi-structured 
interviews with each Director and the Company Secretary (Dunelm 
Group plc, 2013) 
 
2 Board members only 2= The evaluation methods include...semi-structured interviews with 





3 Board and committee meetings as well as 
social events (e.g., board dinner) 
3 = Dr Long attended and observed an entire Board cycle including 
formal Board and Committee meetings and informal sessions 
including dinners (Colt Group SA, 2011) 
 
2 Board and committee meetings only. 2 = She observed the Board, Audit Committee and Remuneration 
Committee meetings (BBA Aviation plc, 2011) 
 
1 Board meeting only 1 = The evaluation methods include….attendance at board meetings  
(Beazly plc, 2012).  
Psychometric 
testing 
1 Board members 1= ...the Board’s performance review included psychometric 




Coding scheme for content covered in board evaluation 
Items Coding Examples from Annual Reports 
Section 1: Evaluation of Board as a cohesive unit  
1. Board task performance   
Assessment of board tasks/overall 
performance  
0/1 1= facilitator was engaged to provide me with an 
understanding of the dynamics and performance of the board 
(BP plc, 2009).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
4 = Directors’ views were sought on the Board’s strategic and 
operational oversight and its input into risk management 
and internal control (InterContinental Hotels Group plc, 
2011).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Assessment of strategy tasks and individual 
strategy task. 
Additional 1for assessment of 
strategy tasks or for each 




Assessment of monitoring tasks and 
individual monitoring task. 
Additional 1 for assessment 
of monitoring tasks or for 
each individual monitoring 
task 
5= The board questionnaire focused on the performance of 
the board throughout the past year in the areas of strategy, 
performance management, management succession, risk 
management (Diageo plc, 2011).                                                                                                                 
6 = to gather their views overall on how the Board is working 
and on specific areas considered most valuable (including: 
strategy; financial monitoring; risk management; Board 
dynamics; balance and composition; and succession planning 
and HR (Croda International plc, 2012). 
 
Assessment of networking tasks and 
individual networking task.  
Additional 1 for assessment 
of networking tasks or for 
each individual networking 
task 
 




Board diversity including gender, nationality 
and cultural background. 
0/1 1= We also specifically asked Directors for their views on the 
diversity of the Board (Aggrekp plc, 2011).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1= Skills balance has also been addressed in our external 
Board evaluation (Dunelm Group plc, 2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
2 = Particular consideration was given to the balance of skills 
and experience.   Other key areas considered during the 
review were the Board’s diversity including gender (Mitie 
Group plc, 2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
3 =  an appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence, diversity (including gender) and knowledge 
of the Company to enable the Directors ... (easyJet plc, 2012). 
 
Board balance - Mix of skills, experiences, 
knowledge and capabilities 
0/1 
 
Board tenure  0/1  
Board independence 0/1  
3. The board culture and processes 
  
 
Board culture  0/1 1 = ..view to asessing whether the interaction of the Board 
creates a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts 
(Barcleys plc, 2009).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 = Effectiveness of meetings and team dynamics 
 




Board cohesiveness And/or 1 = Assessed board 
cohesiveness 
(Electrocomponents plc, 2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 = the culture and contribution of the Board is very 
positive and features high quality debate and challenge (BBA 
Aviation plc, 2011).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
3 = This included a review of the culture and dynamics of 
the Board, the information provided to the Board (Hiscox 
plc, 2011).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
3 = The review ...included consideration of the quality of 
briefings received from management, whether the Board’s 
time was well managed and whether sufficient time was 
reserved for the key issues facing the Company, the quality of 
discussion at meetings (Shire plc, 2009).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 = Board dynamics and relationships; processes, 
information flows and decision making (Hays plc, 2010).  
 
Board process/practices and procedures Additional 1 = Assessed 
board process 
 
Decision making process And/or 1 = Assessed board 
decision making process  
 
Quality of board information and papers And/or 1 = Assessed quality 
of board information and 
papers 
 
Board time management /Prioritisation 
of/allocation of time for agenda based on 
importance 
And/or 1 = Assessed board 
time management  
4. Board leadership and structure   
 
Board leadership 0/1 1 = whether the Board provided effective leadership of the 
Group (BTG plc, 2012). 
 
The board’s terms of reference 0/1 1 = The way in which the board defines its role (Berendsen 
plc, 2011) 
 
Board composition 0/1 1 = The current composition of the Board (Essentra plc, 2012).  
Board support and development 0/1 1 = ….and the support afforded to the Board (Melrose 
Industries plc, 2013). 
 
Evaluation of Chairman performance 0/1 1= to carry out an external evaluation of ….including an 
evaluation of its Chairman (Informa plc, 2010). 
 
Additional 1 = each area 
of performance assessed 
2= there was strong leadership by the Chairman 
(GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2011). 
 





Evaluation of board committees 1 = Mentioned 'board 
committees'; 
1 = ... undertook an externally facilitated evaluation of…. its 
committees (Ashmore Group plc, 2012). 
 
2= Mentioned specific board 
committees 
2= ... also evaluated the Audit, Remuneration and 
Nomination Committees (Hays plc, 2010). 
 
A conclusion on overall committee 
effectiveness 
1 = Conclusion on 
effectiveness drawn 
1 = The report concluded that ... its committees continue to 
operate effectively (KAZ Minerals PLC, 2009). 
 
Structure and composition of board 
committees 
1 = Assessed composition 1 = To re-evaluate the membership ... of the Board 
Committees (BTG plc, 2012) 
 
Board committee process/operation 1 = Assessed process 1 = To re-evaluate the... operation of the Board Committees 
(BTG plc, 2012) 
 
The board committees’ terms of reference 1 = Assessed terms of 
reference 
1= …. terms of reference of the Board Committees (Carillion 
plc, 2012) 
 
Quality of board committee information and 
papers 
1 = Assessed quality of 
information 
1= ...relevance and accuracy of the information provided to ... 
its committees (Stagecoach Group plc, 2013) 
 
Section 3: Evaluation of Individual Director Performance 
 
 
Evaluation of individual board members 1= Assessed 1 = The consultants considered the performance of .. each 
board member (G4S plc, 2011) 
 
Individual director’s contribution to board 
task performance 
Additional 1 = Assessed 
contribution to board tasks 
2= ... other members of the Board were able to devote 
sufficient time to their roles (Shire plc, 2009). 
 
Individual director’s commitment to board 
roles 
Additional 1 = Assessed 
commitment 
3 =….assess that each director is maximising their 
contribution and demonstrating commitment to their role 






Coding scheme for suggestions for improvement 
Main tasks Individual tasks Coding Examples 
1. Suggestions to improve board task performance    
Strategy 
tasks 
Introduction or enhancement of strategic 
away day(s) 
0/1 1 = ….actions arising included enhancements to the annual Board 
strategic ‘away days’ (Catlin Group plc, 2013). 
More time for strategic discussions. 0/1 1 = Making more time in regular Board meetings for strategic debate 
(Centrica plc, 2011).  
Profiling skills of new directors specific to 
company strategy. 
0/1 1 = ..the Board will continue to focus on ensuring that it has the 
appropriate level of skills and experience in relation to the strategic 
objectives of the business (Hays plc, 2010). 
Enhancement of board process to better 
engage in strategy development. 
0/1 1 = More time to be spent defining the Board’s risk appetite (Dunelm 
Group plc, 2013). 
Monitoring 
tasks 
Appointment of independent directors. 0/1 ….we appointed two Non-Executive Directors (Genus plc, 2013). 
Review and monitor succession planning 
for board of directors. 
0/1 1 = The Board succession plan will remain a regular Board agenda item 
(Dunelm Group plc, 2013). 
Review and monitor succession planning 
for executive management. 
0/1 1 = The Board will be developing succession planning for the Group 
Chief Executive (Croda International plc, 2012). 
Review of board size, composition, 
balance and diversity. 
0/1 1= Ensuring that a wide range of skills, experience, background and 
diversity on the Board is maintained (Barcleys plc, 2010). 
Review of size and composition of board 
committees. 
0/1 1 = The Board to plan its composition over the next five to six years, to 
optimise its effectiveness (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2011). 
Review the terms of reference of board of 
directors. 
0/1 1 = Revisiting our matrix of delegated authorities so that the Board best 
uses the finite amount of time available to it (Petrofac plc, 2010). 
Review the terms of reference of board 
committees. 
0/1 1 = The remit and objectives of committees ….. will be formally 
reflected in amended terms of reference (William Hill plc, 2012). 
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Review the executive remuneration policy. 0/1 1 = ...the Group undertook a review of its remuneration policies …. to 
incentivise the delivery of its strategy (Imperial Tobacco Group plc, 
2011). 
Review the risk management and internal 
control procedure. 
0/1 1= Following this review, a new risk management framework ... will be 
implemented throughout the Group (Melrose Industries plc, 2013). 
Increase level of performance oversight. 0/1  1= Key performance metrics have been agreed with the Board and are 
now reviewed annually (Premier Farnell plc, 2013). 
Increase level of strategic oversight. 0/1  1= A review of the strategy was held in March 2013 and further annual 
reviews are scheduled (Premier Farnell plc, 2013). 
Networking 
tasks 
Increase board support to executive 
directors to implement strategic plan. 
0/1 1= To provide enhanced support to the Chief Executive Officer and 
executive board in executing the strategic plan (Berendsen plc, 2011).  
Improve board interaction with 
shareholders. 
0/1 1= The board should ….find ways to expose non-executive directors 
more directly to shareholders’ views (Bae Systems plc, 2010). 
Increased focus on the protection of 
interests of stakeholders. 
0/1 1= The Board has addressed the issues of better stakeholder management 
suggested in the review (Afren plc, 2011). 
2. Suggestions to improve effectiveness of board secretariat  
Improve the content of board information 
and papers. 
0/1 1 = Outcomes of the strategic and risk discussions at the Board Planning 
Conference to be included within each Board pack (BG Group plc, 
2012). 
 
Improve the timeliness of circulating board 
papers. 
0/1 Circulate Board papers at least four days (including two working days) 
before the Board meeting (National Express Group plc, 2011). 
 
Review the timing of board and committee 
meetings. 
0/1 1= ... will review the overall timetabling of Board and Committee 
meetings (Croda International plc, 2012). 
 
Review the agenda items for board and 
committee meetings. 
0/1 and agenda design to ensure the most efficient use of the Board’s time 
(Croda International plc, 2012). 
 
Strengthen the interaction between baord 
secretariat team and board. 
0/1 The appointment of a dedicated Company Secretary will allow more 




3. Suggestions to improve board support and 
development    
Improve the Board’s insight into day-to-
day operation of companies. 
0/1 1 = Develop the programme …..to deepen directors’ understanding of 
the Group’s operations and performance. 
 
Improve the Board’s insight into industry 
and competitors’ trend. 
0/1 1= Board members will be provided with more information on technical 
issues, market trends and political developments (Fresnillo plc, 2011) 
 
Improve the Board's insight into new laws 
and regulations. 
0/1 1= Improving the board’s knowledge and understanding of water 
regulation and the different regulators’ agendas (United Utilities Group 
plc, 2012). 
 
Arrange Board’s visit of sties or factories 
premises. 
0/1 1 = Further consideration to having more site visits (DS Smith plc, 
2012). 
 
Create more opportunities for the Non-
Executive Directors to informally interact 
with senior management. 
0/1 1 = Using the informal time Directors spend together for further 
discussions which would complement the formal Board meetings (DS 
Smith plc, 2012). 
 
Arrange better training opportunities for 
board members. 
0/1 1= …establish a programme of continuing development tailored to 
Directors’ needs and requirements (Booker Group plc, 2013). 
  
Review and improve board induction 
process. 
0/1 1 = …will tailor induction and development programmes for individual 
Directors (BG Group plc, 2012). 
 
 
